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Self-incrimination in the Military Justice System
Recent decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals
(COMA)' in the area of self-incrimination reveal that the court is actively
grappling with questions that are frequently raised during the course of a
criminal investigation. 2 These questions go to the very heart of the elusive
'The United States Court of Military Appeals (COMA) was authorized by Article 67, 10
U.S.C. §867 (1970), of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.'§801 et seq. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ], as an extension of the Executive' branch of government under
Article2 I of the Constitution.
1n United States v. Dohle, 24 C.M.A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975), an accused thief was
questioned by a friend about the accused's role in a robbery from a military armory. At the
time of the questioning, this friend was the military guard who had been detailed to transfer
the accused to confinement. The conversation which followed resulted in incriminating
remarks by the accused which were later used against him at trial. On appeal, COMA reversed
that part of the conviction upon which these statements had an effect.
In so holding, the court resolved a threshold problem concerning the activation of the
UCMJ's Article 31 warnings. See 10 U.S.C. §831 (1970). No longer will a case-by-case
determination be made as to the subjective motivation of the questioning officer vis-a-vis his
capacity as a questioner. Instead, the suspect's perception of his questioner's authority will be
the determing factor for the activation of the Article 31 warning. The result of this seems to be
that the balance in close cases has swung in favor of the individual. The court will no longer
allow these incriminating statements to be saved for use against the accused by means of the
questioner's proof of personal good faith.
In United States v. Kinane, 24 C.M.A. 120, 51 C.M.R. 310 (1976), a suspected thief was
ordered by a criminal investigator to empty his pockets. The result was the production of
incriminating physical evidence which was then used to convict the suspect. Although the
bulk of the opinion was concerned with the legality of the search, the court did state, in an
alternative holding, that such an order was a violation of Article 31. This is apparently based
on section (a) of Article 31 which, if applied literally, would totally prohibit any order which
would result in the incrimination of a suspect. Kinane apparently signals a period of literal
application of this section; however, it should be noted that this evaluation of Kinane is
actually more the result of a logical process of elimination than of any express statement of
the court.
In United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.i. 452 (1976), a criminal
investigator interviewed a suspect over two months after that suspect had requested and
received the assistance of counsel. Prior to this subsequent interview, the investigator had not
informed the suspect's attorney of his intention to question the accused. During the interview,
the suspect waived his previously asserted rights and incriminated himself in the course of the
discussion.
In response to this action on the part of the investigator, COMA took a step which it
had previously threatened to take. In the future, any officer or law enforcement official who is
aware of a suspect's desire at any previous time to avail himself of the right to counsel, may
not question the suspect at all without first affording his counsel a reasonable opportunity to
be present. Failure to comply with this directive is a violation of Article 31 (d) and causes any
information obtained thereby to be excluded.
The most recent of the cases is United States v. Moore, 24 C.M.A. 217, 51 C.M.R. 514
(1976). There COMA gave further definition to one of its previous decisions which had set
forth the standard to be used for determining whether or not an error in the application of a
constitutional right would be considered "harmless." In Moore, the principal issue concerned
the wrongful revelation to the members of the court of the fact that PFC Moore had requested
the presence of an attorney following his advisement of his Article 31 and fifth amendment
rights. In finding the error harmful and in reversing Moore's conviction, COMA stated that
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interface between the civilian and military worlds. Although all of these
problems have not yet been resolved, the court does seem to be moving to
reinforce and even expand the basic right to be free from coerced selfincrimination. The significance of this movement is that it seems to be
more than a mere reflection of the civilian court's protective measures.
Instead, as the cases discussed herein indicate, recent decisions in this area
may more correctly be characterized as attempts by COMA to respond to the
special needs and problems of military personnel.
At the outset, it is important to understand that persons are not shorn
of their constitutional rights when they enter the military.3 However, the
rights of individuals in the military are balanced against, and frequently
subordinated to, the goals of conformity and discipline. When suborsacrifice of rights is often justified on the basis of
dination occurs, the
"military necessity. ' 4 This problem of subordination exists in all aspects
of military activity, but"an area in which this balancing has been put to one
of its severest tests is in the area of self-incrimination.
In the military, the subordinate status of a serviceman dealing with
superiors creates a problem with far-reaching implications. The military
chain-of-command, oriented by necessity towards the preservation of
discipline, can have the effect of forcing a serviceman, obliged to obey all
lawful orders, to incriminate himself while complying with a superior's
directive. 5 It has been conceded that the pressures inherent in a superior
rank or official position can often have the effect of making the mere
asking of a question the equivalent of a command when directed to one
who occupies a subordinate status. 6 When one realizes that the force of a
military order by a superior is one of the strongest inducements known to
the new standard would be one which will consider an error harmful "unless an examination
of the record supports the conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that the error
might have contributed to the conviction." Id. at 219, 51 C.M.R. at 516.
3This position was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137 (1953), where Chief Justice Vinson stated that "[t]he military courts, like the state
courts, have the same responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a
violation of his Constitutional rights." Id. at 142. Similar. statements were made by COMA in
United States v. Culp, 14 C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963), and in United States v. Jacoby, 11
C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960). In Jacoby the court stated: "[I]t is apparent that the
protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication
inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces." 11 C.M.A. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at
246-47. In Culp, COMA quoted from Blackstone's Commentaries: "[H]e puts not off the
citizen when he enters the camp; but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue
so, that he makes himself for a while a soldier." 14 C.M.A. at 206, 33 C.M.R. at 418. See also
Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1240, 1241 (1968) where it is stated: "Persons in the military service are generally entitled
to the rights granted all persons by the Constitution, both as defendants in criminal
and as individuals in a democratic society."
prosecutions
4
See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974);
United5 States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972).
Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv. 3, 70 (1970).
6
United States v. Gibson, 3 C.M.A. 746, 752, 14 C.M.R. 164, 170 (1954).

COMA REVIEW

1976]

205

military law, the full weight of this implicit yet pervasive coercion becomes
more apparent.7 Had this problem remained unchecked, the servicemansuspect would have been left in a very difficult situation, virtually deprived
of the civilian world's guarantees of due process. This note discusses four
cases 8 decided by COMA during its 1975-7.6 term which exemplify the
court's concern for the protection of the fights of service personnel against
the pressures which elicit coerced statements of a self-incriminating nature.
ARTICLE

31(b)

WARNING: QUESTIONER'S AUTHORITY IS DETERMINATIVE

In recognition of the problem created by the subordination of some

constitutional rights in furtherance of military discipline, 9 Congress, in
1950, enacted a protective article for the military, Article 31 of the UCMJ. 10
This statute affords protections more extensive in some respects than those
available in the civilian courts."
COMA, in United States v. Dohle,"2 recently reevaluated and significantly changed an important threshold for the activation of the Article 31
protections. This new threshold, concerning the identity and status of the
7United States v. Jordan, 7 C.M.A. 452, 455, 22 C.M.R. 242, 245 (1957); Manual for
Courts-Martial
171, United States, 1969 (rev.) [hereinafter cited as MCM]; UCMJ art. 92, 10
U.S.C. § 892 (1970).
BSee cases cited at note 2 supra.

9
See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), where the Court recognizes the
problem by stating: "In enacting the [Uniform Code of Military Justice], Congress attempted
to balance these military necessities against the equally significant interest of ensuring fairness
420 U.S. at 757-58.
to servicemen charged with military offenses ....
'°Article 31 provides:
(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate
himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate
him.
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first
informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not
have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or
suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him
in a trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a
statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or
evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be
received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970).
One commentator has described Article 31 (a) as being closely analogous to the fifth
amendment because of its broad prohibition against self-incrimination; Article 31 (b) as being
a codified warning requirement which closely parallels the Miranda warning - a standard
which it preceeded by sixteen years; Article 31 (c) as a prohibition against the production of
irrelevant or degrading material at trial; and Article 31 (d) asa codification of the exclusionary
rule. H. MOYER, JUsTICE AND THE MILrrARY, p. 317, (1972) [hereinafter cited as MOYER].
"MoYER, supra note 10, at 337. Note, for example, that the Article 31 warning can be
activated long before a custodial interrogation occurs which would activate the Miranda
warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1224 C.M.A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975).
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person conducting an investigation or interrogation, applies equally to
sections (a), (b) and (c) of Article'3
In Dohie, the central issue concerned the proper definition and
application of the Article 31 threshold defined by the phase "no person
subject to this chapter." As is apparent from a reading of Article 31, the
protections afforded are prefaced upon the acting party having the status of
a "person subject to this chapter." On its face this status requirement seems
to be of little significance; however, its importance increases dramatically
in light of the past construction given to these words by COMA. 4
"3See note 10 supra.
4
1 By its terms Article 31 (b) is extremely broad. Indeed, a literal application of the article
would have subjected every person in the military to its mandate. Quinn, Some Comparisons
Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1240, 1245 (1968). This
problem did not go long unnoticed. In fact, soon after the Article's passage, it was suggested
that unless Article 31 (b) was somehow limited by judicial interpretation, the ordinary
processes for investigating crime would be seriously impaired. United States v. Wilson, 2
C.M.A. 248, 261, 8 C.M.R. 48, 61 (1953).
In addressing this problem, COMA chose to deny a literal interpretation of the words
"person subject to this chapter." Over the years the case law developed the general rule that
the Article would not be applicable to two classes of persons:
(1) those not engaged in gathering evidence for the prosecution of a crime and,
(2) those not proporting to exercise disciplinary authority over the accused at the
time of questioning.
See Quinn, supra, at 1245-46.
In other words, Article 31 (b) was not applied to a situation in which the questioner and the
accused were engaged in private communication. Id. at 1246. Questioning which was
motivated by other than law enforcement or disciplinary purposes did not require a warning.
See United States v. Beck, 15 C.M.A. 333, 337, 35 C.M.R. 305, 309 (1965).
In an effort to apply this restrictive interpretation to the Article 31 threshold, COMA
resorted to a test of "officiality" to determine when an Article 31 warning was required. See,
e.g., United States v. Dandaneau, 5 C.M.A. 462, 464, 18 C.M.R. 86, 88 (1955); United States v.
Gibson, 3 C.M.A. 746, 752, 14 C.M.R. 164, 170 (1954). This action by the court stopped short
of the recommendations made by the Judge Advocate Generals of the Armed Forces and the
General Counsel for the Treasury following the Wilson case. They had suggested that Article
31 "be redrafted to make it more practical in application so that it does not impose an
insuperable burden upon law enforcement agencies." Maguire, The Warning Requirement of
Article 31 (b): Who Must Do What To Whom and When?, 2 MIL. L. REv. 1, 6 (1958). However,
without redrafting, Article 31 (b) was construed so that had the Article been amended to
conform to its judicial interpretation, it would have read as follows:
No person subject to the code who occupies an official position superior to that
of an accused or suspect or who occupies an official position in connection with law
enforcement, or the detection or investigation of crimes, and no person, whether or
not such person is himself subject to the code, who is acting as the agent of such
first mentioned person, shall, while engaged in an official investigation of an
alleged or suspected offense, unless at some prior time during such investigation the
accused or suspect has been otherwise properly advised and informed, interrogate ....
Id. at 14.
When deciding whether to characterize an exchange as "official" or not, COMA held
that superior rank would not necessarily be conclusive proof of "officiality". See United
States v. Dandaneau, 5 C.M.A. 462, 465, 18 C.M.R. 86, 89(1955). Instead, "officiality" was made
a question of fact, so that if the questioner's motivation was found to have been of a purely
personal nature, the "statement" obtained was held to be admissible despite the absence of a
warning. See United States v. Beck, 15 C.M.A. 533, 337, 35 C.M.R. 305, 309 (1965). In essence,
the "ultimate inquiry in every case is whether the individual, in the line of duty, is acting on
behalf of the service or is motivated solely by personal considerations when he seeks .to
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Prior to the Dohle case, the court had measured a. challenged
interrogation against a subjective standard of "officiality." Using the
"officiality" criterion, a person who was admittedly subject to the UCMJ,
but who was not acting in an official capacity at the time of the
questioning, was not required to give an Article 31 warning.'- The
determination of whether the incriminating statements were "officially"
obtained was deemed a question of fact to be decided by the trial court.1 6
Unfortunately, a consequence of this after-the-fact judicial review was that
the persons in the field, initially responsible for the protection of the
accused's rights, had no clear-cut guidelines as to when the warnings were
required to be given. Unsatisfactory results from the use of "officiality" as a
triggering device for the Article 31 (b) warning have created a climate
17
which makes the continued use of this standard extremely unlikely.
8
In United States v. Seay,' the majority opinion, written by Judge
Fletcher, retained the previously accepted approach while rejecting the
prosecution's claim of non-officiality on the facts.' 9 However, the following
week, in Dohie, Fletcher abandoned the officiality standard and adopted a
position which appears to have been greatly influenced by Judge Ferguson's concurring opinion in Seay.20 In Dohle, Judge Fletcher reviewed the
difficulty of using a subjective test in order to determine the nature of the
questioner's motives. 2 ' After noting the court's general dissatisfaction with
question one whom he suspects of an offense.'" 15 C.M.A. at 338, 35 C.M.R. at 310.
This use of "officiality" as a triggering device for the giving of the Article 31 warning had
the effect of forcing critical evidentiary decisions to turn upon a court's subjective evaluation
of the questioner'smotivation. See United States v. Dohle, 24 C.M.A. 34,51 C.M.R. 84 (1975).
Although this was difficult enough, this determination caused the most difficulty when
factual situations such as the one presented in Dohie occurred, i.e. an interrogation by a
superior officer, when both persons involved were also personal acquaintances. See MoYER,
supra note 10, at 321.
'sSee
United States v. Beck, 15 C.M.A. 333, 337, 35 C.M.R. 305, 309 (1965).
16
d.

17The first signs of a possible bieak came in United States v. Seay, 24 C.M.A. 7, 51 C.M.R.
57 (1975), in which Judge Ferguson, while concurring in the result, wrote a vigorous opinion
arguing in favor of abandoning the case-by-case analysis of "officiality."
1824 C.M.A. 7, 51 C.M.R. 57 (1975).
19The court held that "a warning was still required since the commander was acting in
his official capacity and sought to question the appellant whom he suspected of a criminal
offense." 24 C.M.A. at 9, 51 C.M.R. at 59.
20Judge Ferguson urged a literal application of the phrase "no person subject to this
chapter." His reasoning was based upon the rationale that "[i]n the military, unlike civilian
society, the exact relationship at any given moment between the ordinary soldier and other
service personnel in authority often is unclear." 24 C.M.A. at 12, 51 C.M.R. at 56. He was also
influenced by the presence of the superior/subordinate atmosphere in the military which did
not exist in the civilian world. Id. These combined, he argued, to require a protection
broader than that of the Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). His
recommendation was that "when any person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
questions a person suspected or accused of a violation of the Code without first advising him
of his pertinent rights, he has thereby violated Article 31 .... 24 C.M.A. at 13, 51 C.M.R. at
63.
2"See discussion and authority cited in note 20 supra.
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this approach, Judge Fletcher signaled the court's reversal by stating that
because of the frequent presence of multiple motives, the court no longer
believed that an inquiry into the questioner'smotives ade'quately protected
the accused from an infringement of his Article 31 privileges.2 2 Instead, he
stated that concern should be more properly focused upon the suspect's
state of mind - i.e. his perception of the authority exercised over him by
23
the questioner.
With this as the newly accepted premise, the problem then remaining
to be solved was the formulation of a new guideline. Rather than attempt
to analyze and then characterize each encounter within this complicated
structure of multiple role playing, Judge Fletcher formulated a more
objective guideline:
[W]here a person subject to the Code interrogates-questions-or
requests a statement from an accused or suspect over whom the questioner
has some position of authority of which the accused or suspect is aware,
2
the accused or suspect must be advised in accordance with Article 31. 1
The new standard was formulated primarily for the purpose of
neutralizing the latent effects of the military's discipline oriented social
structure. The principal change accomplished by this new test is that there
is no longer a need to determine whether the actor was exercising some
degree of authority over the suspect. Now, the very fact that he could so act
is enough to require that the warning be given, for "the position of the
questioner, regardless of his motives, may be the moving factor in an
accused's or suspect's decision to speak. '25 It should be noted, however,
that the authority's right to use a volunteered statement of an incriminating nature against an accused is left unchanged by the new standard.
Although the new standard unavoidably keeps a subjective question of
fact before the court, 26 COMA, by predicating the Article 31(b) warning
upon the suspect's awareness of a dominating authority, has dispelled any
notion that it is merely an informational procedure. At the same time, the
fundamental anti-coercive purpose of the warning requirement has been
reaffirmed.27 Similarly, the imposition of the warning requirement on
informers or undercover agents is necessarily foreclosed.
22

United States v. Dohle, 24 C.M.A. at 36, 51 C.M.R. at 86.
2324 C.M.A. at 37, 51 C.M.R. at 87.
24

1d.

25
26

d. at 36-37, 51 C.M.R. at 86-87 (emphasis added).
The court is required to make a determination of "awareness" by the suspect of the
investigator's
authority.
2
1See Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1240, 1247 (1968) which states that "a searching review of the history and
legislative background of the article convinced the Court of Military Appeals that the article
was intended to overcome the pressures inherent in superior rank or official position, which
mnade the mere asking of a question the equivalent of a command."
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It would therefore seem advisable for the court to adopt Judge
Fletcher's position.2s It is a well reasoned attempt to deal with a difficult
problem, and if adopted, it would signal a new and insightful sensitivity for
civil liberties by the civilian judges of the highest court of military law.
ARTICLE 31 (a):

SUSPEcr MAY NOT BE REQUIRED TO Acr AFFIRMATIVELY

In the case of United States v. Kinane,29 COMA indicated that its
concern for individual rights, as exhibited in Dohle,30 had not been a fluke.
In fact, it used the Kinane case to extend the procedural protections against

self-incrimination which are available to servicemen.
The issues raised by Kinane enter a gray area where the procedural
protections affecting searches overlap into the area of the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. 3' Over the years, COMA has dealt with this
problem on several occasions. 32 However, despite those opportunities, the
court has failed to provide guidelines as to what acts are covered by the
Article 31 warning when there is a legally justified search. The finding
of a lawful search has always foreclosed the requirement of an Article 31
warning, 3 even if the requested act might also have constituted a
28
The status of this turnabout is treated in this note as if it were merely a tenative decision
because this new approach was announced solely by Judge Fletcher, with Judges Ferguson
and Cook concurring only in the result. See 24 C.M.A. at 37, 51 C.M.R. at 87. The future of
this approach is made even more uncertain because of two additional facts: Cook's concurring
opinion was founded upon his application of the totality of the circumstances approach
which Fletcher has expressly rejected; and secondly, although Cook remains on the court,
Ferguson has retired and been replaced by Judge Perry. This is especially significant because
Ferguson had withheld his concurrence only because he did not feel the reform had gone far
enough. In light of the above, it is evident that this situation is far from settled.
2924 C.M.A. 120, 51 C.M.R. 310 (1976).
30United States v. Dohle, 24 C.M.A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975).
31This overlap is primarily the result of the expansive definition given by COMA to the
term "statement." Their definition brings the protection of Article 31(b) into play more
frequently than the civilian counterpart, the Miranda warning. The court has expressly
rejected the distinction between oral declarations and physical acts for the purpose of
determining what is, or is not, a statement under Article 31(b). United States v. Nowling, 9
C.M.A. 100, 102, 25 C.M.R. 362, 364 (1958). Instead it has adopted a standard which defines a
"statement" as the result of a request which calls for an affirmative conscious act on the part
of the suspect that involves the conscious exercise of both mind and body. Id. See also United
States v. Holmes, 6 C.M.A. 151, 19 C.M.R. 277 (1955); United States v. Rosato, 3 C.M.A. 143,
11 C.M.R. 143 (1953). A consequence is that handwriting exemplars, United States v.
White, 17 C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967); United States v. Minnifield, 9 C.M.A. 373, 26
C.M.R. 153 (1958), and voice exemplars, United States v. Mewborn, 17 C.M.A. 431, 38
C.M.R. 229 (1968); United States v. Greer, 3 C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953), are both
considered statements by COMA but are not protected by Miranda in the civilian world. See,
e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
32COMA has held that a warning is required prior to a demand for the production of
physical evidence when no lawful search is justified e.g., United States v. Pyatt, 22 C.M.A. 84,
46 C.M.R. 84 (1972); United States v. Corson, 18 C.M.A. 34, 39 C.M.R. 34 (1968); United States
v. Nowling, 9 C.M.A. 100, 25 C.M.R. 362 (1958). It has also held that no warning is required
in order for evidence to be admissible if a lawful search is justified. United States v. Rehm, 19
C.M.A. 559, 42 C.M.R. 161 (1970); United States v. Cuthbert, 11 C.M.A. 272, 29 C.M.R. 88
(1960).

210
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"statement"-a classification demanding Article 31 (b) protection. Although there is precious little to draw upon in the Kinane opinion in this
respect,3 4 and despite other possible interpretations of the holding,3 5 Kinane
34See, e.g., United States v. Kinane, 24 C.M.A. at 122 n.1, 51 C.M.R. 312 n.1, where the
court states:
To the extent that Detective Harris' conduct required the appellant to
participate, without his consent, in the production of evidence which was selfincriminating, Harris' order was also violative of Article 31, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831. (Citations omitted).
s5 0ne interpretation would be that absent a lawful search, an Article 31 warning is
required before any demand is made or-ordergiven for the purpose of acquiring incriminating
evidence. Although this is a plausible interpretation, it cannot be the one intended by COMA
in Kinane. If this were a correct reading of Kinane, it seems certain that the court would have
directly cited Nowling, Corson, and Pyatt. See cases and discussion cited in note 32 supra. All
of these cases dealt with orders to servicemen to produce physical evidence which proved to be
of an incriminating nature, and all held that the failure to preface this order with an Article 31
warning caused the evidence to be inadmissible at trial. Although normally there is little to
draw from a court's failure to directly cite its own precedents, here it seems that the failure
may at least indicate that COMA intends something different by Kinane.
Another reason for rejecting the proposition that absent a lawful search an Article 31
warning must be given before the production of any physical evidence is demanded lies in the
fact that such an interpretation clearly flies in the face of the plain meaning of Article 31(a).
The language of Article 31(a) that "[n]o person subject to this chapter may compel any person
to incriminate himself.. ." leaves no room for a rule that would allow the compulsion if it
was preceded by a 31(b) warning. Article 31(a) is so straight forward it precludes
qualification.
Over the years, COMA has decided many cases in this area which, although probably
yielding the correct result, have been founded upon faulty legal reasoning. Compounding the
error has led to the present confused system of analysis. It is suggested that COMA is just now
beginning to realize the extent of the previous error, and that Kinane, however indirectly, is
the beginning of an attempt to put things back in order. The fallacy which exists is typified
by the reasoning found in the cases of Pyatt and Corson. In each case COMA invalidated a
demand to produce physical evidence that was followed by an act of the suspect which
produced incriminating evidence. The invalidation came on the ground that the demand was
not prefaced upon an Article 31 warning. See United States v. Pyatt, 22 C.M.A. 84, 86, 46
C.M.R. 84, 86 (1972); United States v. Corson, 18 C.M.A. 34, 37, 39 C.M.R. 34, 37 (1968). The
fact that a demand equates to compulsion, and that compulsion is prohibited by Article 31(a),
was completely ignored.
There is no warning of any kind which can lessen Article 31(a)'s mandate against
compulsion. The warning is applicable only within the confines of Article 31(b), a section
dealing exclusively with questions or requests by the investigator, not orders or demands
It is not suggested that Pyatt and Corson have been overruled by Kinane. Although they
should be overruled, because of the confusion they have engendered, it is only asserted here
that Kinane does not stand for the proposition that, absent a lawful search, an Article 31
warning should be given prior to a demand that a suspect produce physical evidence.
Another possible interpretation of the Kinane holding would be that even if a lawful
search is justified, an Article 31 warning must be given to the suspect. Even though this is
exactly what some of the Cuthbert dissenting opinion seems to suggest, this interpretation is
vulnerable in several respects and therefore must also be rejected.
Nothing in Kinane suggests that the court intended to address the problem of a warning
requirement. The question of whether or not the Article 31 warning was given to the suspect
was raised, disputed by the opposing counsel, but never answered one way or the other. The
clear implication of this indifference about the warning is that COMA was not referring to a
violation of 31(b) when it stated that Article 31 had been violated.
Another reason to discount the intent to require a warning in connection with a lawful
search lies in the fact that the Article 31 warning is generally ineffective in terms of physical
objects. The Article 31 warning only informs the suspect that he need not make any
incriminating "statements." With no requirement that the scope of "statement" be explained,
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seems to have substantially altered the currently used "search determinative" approach.
The majority in Kinane says that regardless of probable cause, legal
search or Article 31 warnings, no person may compel a suspect to
incriminate himself. This holding is significant because COMA, over the
last twenty-five years, has always rather losely referred to Article 31 as a
unitary entity, while consistently focusing on the warning requirement of
section 31(b) in situations such as that in Kinane.s6 Now, it seems that,
although the court has retained its custom of referring to Article 31 as a
unit, section 31 (a) is being placed in a featured role.
The basis of this belief and the background for this discussion are taken
from the dissenting opinion of Judge Ferguson in United States v.
Cuthbert." In his dissent, Judge Ferguson criticized the interpretation of
both the facts and the law adopted in the Cuthbert majority opinion.
Specifically, he pointed out the majority's error in reading the case of
United States v. Nowling 8 as standing for the proposition that a search
9
justified by a lawful arrest made Article 31 warnings unnecessaty.S To
Judge Ferguson, the court's attention should have been directed toward an
40
examination of what the accused had been positively required to do.
see note 31 supra, a suspect would normally assume that it is limited to oral utterances. So
from the start, the usefulness of such a warning would be limited. See United States v.
Nowling, 9 C.M.A. 100, 104, 25 C.M.R. 362, 366 (1958) (Latimer, J., dissenting).
Despite the questionable usefulness of the warning in this type of situation, the giving of
a warning when a search is also justified would create a situation which could greatly
compromise the very purpose of the warning requirement. This would occur in situations
where, after receiving the warning, a suspect who knew that the term "statement" had a rather
expansive definition availed himself of the right not to turn over the object. The
investigator's next probable step would be to search the suspect and take the object himself an act which could have been done at the outset because a lawful search was justified.
However, the consequence of this sequence of events would run completely counter to the
purposes of the warning requirement. The warning, which was intended to neutralize the
coercive atmosphere of such a confrontation, would suddenly appear to be an empty promise,
and the hopelessness of the situation would be compounded in the eyes of the accused. Also,
rather than aiding the military police in maintaining order, the warning would become a
source 6f many disputes between suspects and the military police. See id.
It seems that the preferred method of operation in situations such as this would be to
require the investigator to search a suspect, when such a search was justified, and seize any
object himself. Then, if the investigator deemed interrogation necessary, the Article 31
warning could be given. This would preserve both the integrity and utility of the warning
requirement while at the same time affording the suspect with better protection from coerced
self-incrimination.
S6See note 10 supra. Although COMA has a long history of applying Article 31(a) in
situations where a suspect has been compelled to act by a superior, e.g., United States v. Ruiz,
23 C.M.A. 181, 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974); United States v. Jordan, 7 C.M.A. 452, 22 C.M.R. 242
(1957); United States v. Taylor, 5 C.M.A. 178, 17 C.M.R. 178 (1954); United States v. Eggers, 3
C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953), it has not previously applied this section to a situation in
which a physical object was the subject of the investigation.

C.M.A. 272, 275, 29 C.M.R. 88, 91 (1960).
5ll
5
s United States v. Nowling, 9 C.M.A. 100, 25 C.M.R. 362 (1958).
s 9United States v. Cuthbert, 11 C.M.A. at 279, 29 C.M.R. at 95. See note 35 supra.
4011 C.M.A. at 279, 29 C.M.R. at 95.
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Based upon this analysis, Judge Ferguson found Cuthbert to be indistinguishable from Nowling.4' He categorized both incidents as simply
being orders to produce incriminating evidence, given by persons in
authority to subordinated suspects. 42 Without any reference to the
lawfulness of a search or of the need for an Article 31 warning, Judge
Ferguson gave his interpretation of Article 31 in a manner which strongly
suggests that it was section (a) to which he was referring:
However, when accused is personally required to act in the production of
evidence against himself, Article 31 comes into play, and affords protection. It is to prevent such compelled affirmative incriminatory action
by the accused that the Article was enacted.., and the distinction between
of accused's pockets and an authorized
personal production of the contents
43
search by a third party is clear.
If it is correct to say that COMA's reliance in Kinane upon Ferguson's
dissenting opinion from Cuthbert indicates that Article 31 (a) will
henceforth be literally applied by the court, the Kinane opinion certainly
leaves the underlying purpose of this change open to speculation. It is
suggested that the justification for such an absolute position must lie in the
court's recently heightened awareness of the possible effects that the chainof-command might have on the criminal investigation process.
44
In the civilian world, the courts have determined that the Miranda
warning is a sufficient procedural safeguard to protect the right of the
criminal suspect to be free from a coerced admission or confession. The
Miranda warning is felt to strike a proper balance between the rights of the
individual and the rights of society. However, this balance is upset in the
military because the military's demand for obedience is unmatched in the
civilian world. This obedience introduces an additional coercive factor
into the investigatory process. Kinane represents a recognition of the fact
that, in the military, despite the protective provisions of the Miranda and
Article 31 (b) warnings, the scales are definitely weighted against the
serviceman by the disciplinary factor. The court's literal application of
Article 31 (a) would certainly do a great deal to compensate for this
imbalance.
The procedural implementation of this new approach to the selfincrimination problem will give the clearest indication of whether service
personnel have actually received any added protection. In addressing this
41

d.
421d.
"sId. It is asserted here that the reference in Kinane to the effect that "[t]he identity of the
hand placed in the appellant's pocket to retrive the ID cards is not controlling," refers only to
the fact that the identity of the hand will not be determinative as to whether or not a search is
being conducted. United States v. Kinane, 24 C.M.A. at 122, 51 C.M.R. at 312. The identity of
the hand is still very important in terms of Article 31(a) and the issue of compulsory
compliance with an investigator's order.
44Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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problem, COMA has decided that instead of attempting to trim the scales
by means of some new warning requirement - perhaps because of its
repeated inability to draw a firm distinction between a search and an
interrogation 45 - it will opt for complete non-participation by the suspect.
This means that the object of a lawful search may be seized, even if it falls
within COMA's definition of "statement, '"46 and that no warning need be
given to the suspect prior to such a taking. Absent a lawful search, the
Article 31 warning should be given because the suspect may choose to turn
over the object voluntarily. The effect of the application of Article 31 (a) is
that the suspect may remain completely passive if he so chooses. Although
the test continues to be "search determinative," the procedural application
is altered to better protect the suspect. The line beyond which routine
disciplinary responses are superceded by the protections afforded a criminal
suspect is now more clearly delineated.
45

The precise question raised here was framed in United States v. Insani, 10 C.M.A. 519,
28 C.M.R. 85 (1959), when COMA stated:
Where there is either interrogation or a search, the admissibility of evidence
obtained therefrom is ordinarily tested by the principles applicable to the one or the
other, as the case may be, but not to both.
Id. at 520, 28 C.M.R. at 86.
Although Insaniwas used to clarify a very basic problem in this regard, that a request by
an investigator for permission to search a suspect is not an "interrogation" and the reply by
the suspect is not a "statement," the critical problem of not being able to distinguish a search
from an interrogation upon the facts of a case has been left unanswered.
Even though the Insani court indicated that where both a search and an interrogation
would accurately characterize a confrontation, one or the other would be applied to determine
the admissibility of the evidence obtained, no guidance has been given in choosing the proper
characterization for a given factual setting. In fact, the court has virtually thrown its arms
into the air in confusion, as evidenced by the decision in United States v. Pyatt:
Whether the appellant's disclosure of the contents of his wallet be demoninated
a statement or the result of a search is unimportant under the circumstances of this
case.
22 C.M.A. at 86, 46 C.M.R. at 86.
A similar result was reached in the earlier case of United States v. Corson, 18 C.M.A. 34,
39 C.M.R. 34 (1968), where COMA expressly declined to reach the probable cause issue.
The problem that comes from this type of treatment is that the field investigator is given
nothing in the way of guidance. Basing decisions upon the "circumstances of this case" is a
very questionable practice by COMA when the hatchet of the exclusionary rule hangs in the
balance.
Perhaps a reevaluation of Judge Latimer's dissenting argument in Nowling could help
clarify this troublesome area. He argued that a "statement" should only include within its
scope those activities which require "the active and conscious use of the mental facilities in
the production of evidence not theretofore in existence." United States v. Nowling, 9 C.M.A.
100, 106, 25 C.M.R. 362, 368 (1958) (emphasis added). Under such a standard, intelligible
gestures and identifying movements would qualify as statements, but movements to produce
objects would not. This means, of course, that the seizure of all objects would have to be
justified by a legal search, but such is the standard already in use. Such a standard could be
easily applied in the field, and the exclusionary rule would be called upon in many fewer
instances.
46This result is not unlike that reached in United States v. Cuthbert, 11 C.M.A. 272, 29
C.M.R. 88 (1960), and United States v. Coakley, 18 C.M.A. 511, 40 C.M.R. 223 (1969), except
that in the future, the investigator, not the suspect, will personally execute the search.
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On its face, this prohibition of an order to a suspect to produce
evidence which could otherwise be obtained by means of a legally justified
search of the accused is open to criticism as being a pro-criminal stumbling
block which will needlessly impede the business of the police. However,
viewed as an attempt by the court to keep the everyday workings of the
military's disciplinary system demonstrably separated from the process of a
criminal investigation, the court's position is more readily defensible. In
order to prevent a blurring of the two systems, Article 31 (a) will be literally
applied so that no suspect incriminates himself while under the mistaken
belief that he must continue to comply with all orders of his superiors.
Lawful search or not, the possibility of confusion in this area is so great
that COMA has chosen to avoid the problem completely by making the
47
suspect a non-participant.
REQUIRED NOTIFICATION OF SUSPEcr's ATTORNEY

In United States v. McOmber,48 COMA employed the exlusionary rule
to effectuate its previously announced requirement that a criminal investigator must deal directly with an accused's counsel, when he has one,
instead of with the accused himself. 49 The importance of this decision lies
in its break with a line of cases in which the court had allowed clear
violations of the Manual to be nullified by an accused's voluntary waiver of
his statutory rights. 50 Each time that an investigator had circumvented the
presence of counsel and had obtained incriminating evidence from an
accused, COMA had affirmed the accused's conviction even though it was
obtained, at least in part, in violation of the Manual. 5' Consequently,
when McOmber appealed his conviction, the government conceded that the
47

0f course, the possibility that latent coercion will adversely affect the suspect will
continue to exist so long as an officer who routinely exercises command authority over the
suspect is also allowed to conduct criminal investigations.
4824 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976).
9

" The requirement that the government's trial counsel deal only with the accused's
attorney, if and when he has one, is dictated by MCM U.44h, 1969 (rev.).
The Manual is authorized by UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970). It is issued as an

executive order, and as such, it is entitled to be applied with the force of law. See, e.g., United
States v. Smith, 13 C.M.A. 105, 32 C.M.R. 105 (1962); United States v. Villasenor, 6 C.M.A. 3,
19 C.M.R. 129 (1955).
COMA has expanded upon the requirement of the Manual and has decreed that criminal
investigators, like trial counsel, must deal with an accused's counsel, and not with the accused
directly. See United States v. Estep, 19 C.M.A. 201, 202, 41 C.M.R. 201, 202 (1970).
50
United States v. Johnson, 20 C.M.A. 320, 43 C.M.R. 160 (1971); United States v. Flack,
20 C.M.A. 201, 43 C.M.R. 41 (1970); United States v. Estep, 19 C.M.A. 201, 41 C.M.R. 201
(1970).
These cases held that an accused could voluntarily waive his right to counsel, and thus
correct any error that an investigator had made by not dealing with the accused's counsel
directly.
51
See cases and discussion cited in note 50 supra.
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investigator had violated paragraph 44h of the Manual but relied upon the
court's previous pronouncements in arguing that Airman McOmber's
waiver of his right to have the assistance of counsel at the interrogation had
corrected any prejudicial effects of the investigator's error.5 2
In McOmber, the defendant was apprehended and taken'to the office of
the security police on suspicion of theft. There he was advised of the
nature of his suspected offense, his right to remain silent, and his rights
concerning counsel.5 3 McOmber requested the assistance of counsel,
whereupon the interrogating agent terminated the session and provided the
accused with the information necessary to obtain an attorney. This was not
the sequence of events in which the court found error. Rather, almost two
months after McOmber's attorney had contacted the criminal investigator
to discuss the issues of the case, the investigator again warned and then
interrogated the accused about the previously alleged offense and other
related crimes. Despite the investigator's knowledge that McOmber had an
attorney, the attorney was not notified of this second interrogation until
after it was completed. It was during this second interrogation that
McOmber made several incriminating statements which were later used
against him at trial. The investigator's "secret" interrogation forced
McOmber to face his prosecutors alone and violated not only the Manual, 54
but arguably the Constitution as well. 55
On appeal, COMA held that this action by the investigator was a
violation of rights guaranteed by the Manual, 56 and as such, required that
any incriminating evidence obtained thereby was to be considered per se
involuntarily given, and thus inadmissible at trial. 57 The significance of
this decision is not in the requirement that an accused's counsel be put on
C.M.A. at 208, 51 C.M.R. at 453.
53See UCMJ art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (b) (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
54
See note 49 supra.
55
See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967), where the Court states:
[I~n addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he
need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or
informal, in court or not, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's
5224

right to a fair trial.
See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
56
See note 49 supra. In doing so, COMA adhered to its practice of deciding the casv,
wherever possible, upon a statutory, as opposed to a constitutional, foundation. Although the
court raised the possibility of a problem with the sixth amendment, it based its decision
squarely and solely on paragraph 44h of the Manual. United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A. at
208, 57
51 C.M.R. at 453.
COMA held that any statement obtained through this procedure would be considered
involuntary under Article 31(d) and thus inadmissible. United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A.
at 209, 51 C.M.R. at 454.
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notice,5" but rather, it stems from the court's decision to exclude evidence
obtained by the investigator in violation of the accused's right.5 9
In announcing the holding of the court, Judge Fletcher reflected upon
the inadequacy of the court's former approach to this problem. 60 With an
almost audible sense of disappointment, Fletcher commented that the
present case evidenced "a continuing reluctance to abide by previous
guidance absent the implementation of a judicial sanction to retard future
violations."' 8
In an effort to protect an accused's right to have the
assistance of counsel during interrogation from infringement by his
questioners, the court adopted a new operational standard for situations in
which an investigator questions an accused known to be represented by
counsel. It held as follows:
[O]nce an investigator is on notice that an attorney has undertaken to
represent an individual in a military criminal investigation, further
questioning of the accused without affording counsel reasonable opportunity to be present renders any statement obtained involuntary under
Article 31 (d) of the Uniform Code. This includes questionings with
regard to the accused's future desires with respect to counsel as well as his
right to remain silent, for a lawyer's counseling on these two matters in62
many instances may be the most important advice ever given his client.
It should be understood that COMA has not held that a suspect may
not waive the right to have the presence and assistance of counsel or the
right to remain silent. Rather, the courts has held only that a suspect who
has at one time felt the need for help should not be placed in a situation in
which he could feel compelled by those in charge of his prosecution to give
up his rights. The presence of counsel is one method to insure that the
' t Such had been the holding of the prior cases of Johnson, Flack and Estep. See cases
and discussion cited in note 50 supra.
S9The validity of the theory which utilizes the exclusionary rule to "punish" the police in
hopes of deterring violations of prisoner's rights will not be discussed here. It is enough to say
that COMA's decision to employ the theory here suggests that the court has perceived a very
real and very great possibility that the rights of service personnel will be infringed. Although
it would probably be incorrect to classify this as a "desperate" move, it would certainly qualify
as a bold step by COMA.
"°Judge Fletcher stated that under COMA's prior case law an investigator's minimum
responsibility in questioning a suspect was the same whether the suspect had an attorney or
not. Both situations required only a combined Miranda-Tempiawarning, see note 70 infra,
and Article 31 warning in order to avoid the judicial application of the exclusionary rule,
absent an actual showing of coercion. Consequently, there was no reason to respect a
suspect's right to counsel, so long as the proper warnings were given. 24 C.M.A. at 209, 51
C.M.R. at 454.
Unfortunately, not only was the right to counsel receiving inadequate protection, but in
Fletcher's estimation, the court's prior use of a voluntariness standard had tended to encourage
infractions of the Manual's directive rather than to diminish them. Id. at 208-09, 51 C.M.R. at

453-54.
61United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A. at 208, 51 C.M.R. at 453.
6 Id. at 209, 51 C.M.R. at 454.
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has
same test of "voluntariness" 64 in the waiver of one's rights will apply as
was applied prior to McOmber.
Admittedly, any absolute rule of exclusion is very harsh from a
prosecution point of view. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the tone of the
court's opinion that this measure was taken only as a last resort. It was
only the continually poor performance of government investigators during
this "critical stage" of the investigatory proceedings that unified this
65
otherwise divergent court on a remedy as volatile as the exclusionary rule.
Another significant aspect of this case lies in the boldness of COMA's
approach to this problem in comparison to the treatment given to it by
civilian courts. Although several of the circuits have issued opinions
critical of the investigator's failure to notify a suspect's attorney as a denial
of the accused's right to counsel, not one has found such a practice to
constitute reversible error so long as the accused has been properly advised
of his right to have the presence of counsel and has voluntarily elected to
proceed. 66 Significantly, COMA was fully aware of the holdings of the
civilian courts when it rendered the McOmber decision. 67 As did the
Dohle68 and Kinane69 opinions, this decision reaffirms the Court of
Military Appeals' determination to protect, and perhaps even expand, the
rights guaranteed to military personnel. Here in a factual setting which

6SThis was also the essence of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), as exemplified by the following passage:
The presence of counsel.., would be the adequate protective device necessary
to make the process of police interrogation to conform to the dictates of the
privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the governmentestablished atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.
Id. at 466.
6In United States v. Colbert, 2 C.M.A. 3, 6 C.M.R. 3 (1952), COMA construed the term
"voluntary" to mean:
[T]he confession must be the product of a free choice - of a will not
encumbered or burdened by threats, promises, inducements, or physical or mental"
abuse. Moreover, the threats, promises, or inducements which may be held to have
produced an involuntary confession must be of such a serious or substantial nature
that they could possibly have operated to impair the defendant's freedom of will.
Id. at 7, 6 C.M.R. at 8.
The court subsequently expressed the standard as being one of "whether the accused
was deprived of his mental freedom to speak or to stand mute." United States v. Josey, 3
C.M.A. 767, 775, 14 C.M.R. 185, 193 (1954). See also cases cited at note 50 supra.
6
sSee notes 57 and 59 supra.
66
See, e.g., Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Crook, 502
F.2d 1378 (3rd Cir. 1974); Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cobbs,
481 F.2d 196 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
6724 C.M.A. at 209, 51 C.M.R. at 454 (Cook, J., concurring). A more thorough discussion
of Civilian courts' treatment of this problem is provided in United States v. Collier, 24 C.M.A.
183, 188 n.5, 51 C.M.R. 428, 433 n.5 (1976), a case which probably would have announced the
McOmber test if the factual setting had been appropriate.
68
United States v. Dohle, 24 C.M.A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975). See notes 12-28, supra, and
text accompanying.
69
United States v. Kinane, 24 C.M.A. 120, 51 C.M.R. 310 (1976). See notes 29-47, supra,
and text accompanying.
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differs little from that of the civilian world, the court has shown its
willingness to differ markedly with the civilian courts. This independent
spirit may very well be the element for which COMA has been searching to
enable it to exercise the flexibility that is demanded by the dualistic system
of individual rights and military obligations encountered in the military
today.
DISCLOSURE OF A SUSPECT'S REQUEST FOR COUNSEL

In the case of United States v. Moore,70 COMA dealt with the problem
of indirect erosion of a serviceman's constitutionally guaranteed right to
assistance of counsel during an interrogation. In this case, COMA not only
reaffirmed the serviceman's right to counsel, but more importantly, the
court used Moore to announce a significant change in one of the standards
used to determine whether alleged errors in court-martial proceedings are
"harmless."
In Moore, the trial judge, in attempting to lay a proper foundation for
the admission of evidence, questioned a criminal investigator about the
facts surrounding the interrogation of the accused. As a result of these
questions the court members were informed that PFC Moore had requested
the assistance of an attorney after having been advised of his right thereto
by the investigator. 7' Although it is well established that it is improper to
2
reveal to the triers of fact that a suspect has availed himself of this right,7
what has not been so firmly established is the standard against which an
error of this nature should be measured in order to determine whether a
73
conviction requires reversal.
7024 C.M.A. 217, 51 C.M.R. 514 (1976).
71Id. at 218, 51 C.M.R. at 515.
72United States v. Nees, 18 C.M.A. 29, 39 C.M.R. 29 (1968). Only since COMA's decision
in United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967), has the right to have the
assistance of counsel been a required part of the pre-interrogation warning given by military
police. Consequently, the court frequently cites cases involving the analagous issue of one's
right to remain silent as being on point. See, e.g., United States v. Stegar, 16 C.M.A. 569, 37
C.M.R. 189 (1967); United States v. Martin, 16 C.M.A. 531, 37 C.M.R. 151 (1967); United States
v. Kavula, 16 C.M.A. 468, 37 C.M.R. 88 (1966); United States v. Andrews, 16 C.M.A. 20, 36
C.M.R. 176 (1966); United States v. Jones, 16 C.M.A. 22, 36 C.M.R. 178 (1966); United States v.
Workman, 15 C.M.A. 228, 35 C.M.R. 200 (1965); United States v. Hickman, 10 C.M.A. 568, 28
C.M.R.
134 (1959).
7
3COMA's starting point for determining "harmless" or "prejudicial" error is UCMJ art.
59, which states:
A finding or sentence of a court-martial may not be held incorrect on the
ground of an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial
rights of the accused.
10 U.S.C. § 859 (a) (1975).
Although the UCMJ dictates a very strict standard before prejudicial error will be found,
COMA, almost from its inception, has modified this standard to bring a broader sweep of
errors within the prejudicial category. See United States v. Lee, 1 C.M.A. 212, 2 C.M.R. 118
(1952); United States v. Berry, 1 C.M.A. 235, 2 C.M.R. 141 (1952). See also Willis, The United
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Previous decisions by COMA, relying in great part upon the UCMJ's
standard for specific prejudice, had utilized a markedly different standard
than that announced in Moore.7 4 In general, these cases were decided on
the basis of whether there was clear and convincing evidence in the record
which was sufficient in itself to negative the "fair risk" that the court,
"when faced with two inconsistent stories, had solved its dilemma by
75
tossing into the balance the accused's pre-trial reliance upon his rights."
Consequently, when the other evidence was found to have left no room for
the court to speculate as to the implications of guilt which might have
flowed from the accused's consultation with counsel, no "fair risk" of
76
prejudice was found to exist, and the error was "harmless."
In Moore, the court significantly altered the natuie of the presumption
to be used in making this determination of prejudice, vel non. In reversing
Moore's conviction, the court held that henceforth, "the error is not
harmless unless the reviewing court can affirmatively find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error might not have contributed to the
conviction.'' 77 In contrast to its previous standard, which had required that
specific indicia of prejudice be found before an error would be considered
of any consequence, 78 COMA's new standard presumes that the error is
harmful, "unless an examination of the record supports the conclusion that
there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to
the conviction. ' 79 Although this is not a test which requires automatic
reversal, it certainly is one which will be very difficult for the government
to satisfy. If literally applied, only the barest possibility of prejudice could
dictate a reversal.8 0
States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operationand Future,55 MIL. L. REV. 39, 80-81
(1972).
The most recent standard of error used by the court is one based on the "fair risk" of
prejudice to the accused. As described by one commentator, "the court looks to the whole
'proceeding, including the error, and determines whether or not a fair risk exists that the courtmartial was influenced adversely to the accused by the error." Larkin, When Is An Error
Harmless?, 22 JAG J. 65, 67-68 (December 1967-January 1968). See United States v. Martin,'16
C.M.A. 531, 37 C.M.R. 151 (1967); United States v. Jones, 16 C.M.A. 22, 36 C.M.R. 178 (1966);
United
States v. Workman, 15 C.M.A. 228, 35 C.M.R. 200 (1965).
74
See discussion and authorities cited in note 73 supra.
75
United States v. Jones, 16 C.M.A. 22, 23-24, 36 C.M.R. 178, 179-00 (1966).
76United States v. Workman,.15 C.M.A. 228, 235, 35 C.M.R. 200, 207 (1965).
7724 C.M.A. at 219, 51 C.M.R. at 516.
78
1d.
791d. (emphasis added). In emphasizing its break with the old standard, the majority
opinion commented that the government had only presented evidence which indicated that
specific prejudice had been searched for, but not found. This, said the court, was sufficient to
sustain the government's burden of showing that it was a harmless error, because it ignored
the proper emphasis. Apparently, the government should have attempted to prove that
beyond all reasonable doubt the suspect would have been convicted even absent the error. This
is not to say that the government should have argued that all of the other evidence proved the
accused to be guilty, instead, it should have focused on proving the improbability of any other
result.
8OSee Thompson, UnconstitutionalSearch and Seizure and the Myth of Harmless Error,

42
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457 (1967).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:203

In the self-incrimination and right to counsel contexts, Moore stands as
an additional indication of COMA's desire to protect the rights of
servicemen from the effects of subtle coercion. Evidence of such an intent is
found in the rationale given for the holding. COMA's decision to categorize
the revelation as error was "founded upon the open-eyed realization that
to many, even to those who ought know better, the invocation by a suspect
of his constitutional and statutory rights to silence and to counsel equates
to a conclusion of guilt .... -81 Apparently the court's new standard for
harmless error was a calculated attempt to counter the possibility that a
court's members could be persuaded by the theory that "a truly innocent
accused has nothing to hide behind [the] assertion of these privileges. '8 2 As
such, the Moore opinion is both a realistic attempt to deal with a widely
held prejudice and an example of the lengths to which the court is willing
to go in order to insure that a serviceman's court-martial is a truly objective
proceeding. Although noteworthy for its treatment of the self-incrimination problem, Moore may also be important in terms of predicting COMA's
future action.
Historically, the court has recognized three types of errors - fundamental constitutional and codal errors, constitutional errors which are not
considered to be fundamental, and other errors.83 In terms of prejudice to
the accused, the first group has been considered prejudicial per se, and the
second and third groups have been measured against various standards of
reasonableness, usually expressed in terms of whether or not a "fair risk" of
84
prejudice was caused by the error.
Over the years, the first of these categories has remained relatively
unchanged. The second category, that of non-fundamental constitutional
errors, was changed by COMA's recent decisions in United States v. Ward85
and United States v. Starr.8 6 The Supreme Court's "harmless error" test from
Chapman v. California7 was utilized in these cases as a substitute for
the previously used standard of a "fair risk" of prejudice. The third
category, the one containing all the other errors in terms of procedure,
evidence, instructions and the conduct of the parties,88 is the category into
which the Moore case falls.
8
'United States v. Moore, 24 C.M.A. 217, 218, 51 C.M.R. 514, 515 (1976), citing Ullman v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
82Id.
83
See Larkin, When Is An Error Harmless?, 22 JAG J. 65, 69 (December 1967-January
1968).
84
See id.
-23 C.M.A. 572, 50 C.M.R. 837 (1975). See note 90 infra.
8623 C.M.A. 584, 50 C.M.R. 849 (1975). See note 91 infra.
87386 U.S. 18 (1967). Chapman was the Court's clarification and refinement of its earlier
decision in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
88
See Larkin, When Is An Error Harmless? 22 JAG J. 65, 69 (December 1967-January
1968).
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The standard announced in Moore is not original to that opinion. It
was first employed by COMA in United States v. Ward,8 9 but in Ward the
holding was premised upon the finding of an error "founded solely upon
the federal constitution." 90 The adoption of the Ward test in the Moore case
is significant not only because of its protection of an individual's rights, but
also because it is the first time that COMA has applied this very stringent
standard to a non-constitutional error. 9'
The question raised by Moore is how far will this very strict test for
harmless error be extended? More specifically, is Moore indicative of
changes that will be made in connection with other errors falling within
the third category, dr is Moore to be limited to its facts because of their very
close association with the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel? The
only indication of where Moore may ultimately lead comes from the
opinion itself, where the court stated that "an error of this sort ... must
yield to the test enunciated in Ward." 92 The "sort" of errors this proserviceman test will come to include is open to speculation. Although there
is some indication that this standard will not be all encompassing," the
court's intent in this area is far from clear. It seems possible that COMA
will learn the lessons of the past 94 and will retain the "fair risk" test for the
majority of errors contained in the third category. However, it is also very
8923 C.M.A. 572, 50 C.M.R. 837 (1975).
90

1n Ward, the error at trial was the admission into evidence of certain physical evidence
which had been illegally seized in violation of the accused's fourth amendment rights. In
overturning the accused's conviction, COMA invalidated the trial court's "significant impact"
standard for prejudice, 23 C.M.A. at 574, 50 C.M.R. at 839, and held that "before an error
founded solely upon the federal constitution can be held harmless under Article 59(a), the
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 23
C.M.A. at 576, 50 C.M.R. at 841.
91
Although the Chapman test was applied by COMA in the case of United States v. Starr,
23 C.M.A. 584, 50 C.M.R. 849 (1975), prior to the Moore decision, the Starr case involved the
admission into evidence of incriminating statements made by the accused while testifying in a
hearing on a motion to surpress illegally seized evidence, and as such, it, like Ward, involved a
constitutional error.
9224 C.M.A. at 218, 51 C.M.R. at 515 (emphasis added).
93
See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 24 C.M.A. 290, 52 C.M.R. 1 (1976). In Wright, a
serviceman appealed his conviction because it became known after his conviction that the
government's trial counsel was not in fact an attorney, had never graduated from an accredited
law school and was not a member of any state or federal bar. COMA, in sustaining his
conviction, held that despite the appellant's prosecution by an improperly qualified person,
there 94was no specific evidence of substantial prejudice, and so the error was harmless.
At the turn of the century, civilian courts were approaching the point where virtually
any error at trial would provide an adequate basis for reversal of a conviction. In response to
that situation, Congress passed a "federal harmless error statute" in 1919, now restated in
Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which made all errors which did not affect
the substantial rights of the parties harmless. UCMJ art. 59(a), 10 U.S.C. § 859(a), was
the application of this standard to military law. Both of those Congiessional acts were
intended to reverse the trend toward automatic reversal by appellate courts. All agreed that a
person was entitled to a fair trial, but few felt that it had to be perfect. Now, as the very strict
Chapman test is injected into more and more factual situations, the problems faced at the turn
of the century loom large again. See Larkin, When Is An Error Harmless?, 22 JAG J. 65
(December 1967-January 1968).
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likely that the court will methodically increase the scope of the Chapman
test to include all of those errors which, although not actually constitutional violations, are closely tied to the protections guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution. This result would be consistent with other
recent decisions by COMA in the self-incrimination area, and yet, it would
avoid the impossible problems which flow from a system that regards all
errors as reversible errors.
CONCLUSION

As illustrated by the cases discussed, COMA is acutely aware of the
serious problems which arise in the military in the self-incrimination area.
Although not forgetting the requirements imposed by the military's
disciplinary needs, the court has served notice that both the letter and the
spirit of the Constitution will be followed. With increasing frequency the
claim of "military necessity," commonly raised by government prosecutors
to excuse questionable iniestigative conduct, has been more closely
scrutinized and more often rejected.
COMA has transformed the military courts from a tool that could be
used by the military for its own purposes, into independent tribunals of
justice which stand ready to protect the rights of the individual against the
pressures that are inherent in the military system. This change was neither
begun nor completed during this past term; however, it may be said that
COMA's recent decisions in the area of self-incrimination both reaffirm
and extend the court's commitment to the protection of the individual.
Perhaps of greatest significance, it is now imminently clear that the court is
willing to assume the ultimate responsibility for new and unique protective
measures. It appears that the court is no longer content to wait and see
which direction the civilian courts will choose; COMA has elected to lead,
and even contradict the civilian courts when it feels that the need to do so is
great.
RANDALL R. RIGGS

